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The Proper Role of Responsive Democracy, Liberty,  
and Immigration in Global Justice: Some Clarifications 
 
Gillian Brock1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Anthony Langlois and Graham Findlay have offered superb challenges and I am grateful 
for the opportunity their comments have presented to develop my position on various 
matters of global justice.   In the next section I summarize some of their key charges and 
begin my response to Langlois, especially on the key charge that my account of democracy 
is defective.  Section 3 deepens the analysis by pointing out some important tensions in 
the desiderata we have for accounts of global justice, such as tensions in trying to secure 
relevant freedom and equality for all.  Democratic Equality tries to resolve such tensions.  
However, the existence of these tensions also means that there is scope for at least two 
forms of democracy: a more agency promoting, participatory kind and, to supplement where 
participatory forms of democracy fail, the kind that is more responsive to interests and in-
volves considerable delegation. This is discussed in section 4.  Section 5 discusses how 
Democratic Equality is compatible with, and can be supported by Responsive Democracy 
–how indeed they complement each other, especially in my account of global justice.  Sec-
tion 6 takes up several of Graham Findlay’s further challenges concerning the appropriate 
role for liberty and freedom of migration in an account of global justice. 
 
A SUMMARY OF KEY CHARGES MADE BY LANGLOIS AND FINDLAY  
AND SOME INITIAL RESPONSES 
 
Langlois is concerned that the individualism at the heart of liberal cosmopolitanism is not 
adequately accommodated by the kind of Responsive Democracy I endorse.  He interprets 
my talking up the advantages of responsive democracy at the international level as prob-
lematic because it is not clear that “the people” would always agree with me about projects 
that enhance the realization of people’s interests.  
 
The people are –at one remove and then at another– gently sundered from 
their traditional role within democratic theory as active agents claiming the 
freedom to determine their political future, and are re-designated as the owners 
of sets of interests which are articulated for them, and which governance me-
chanisms are created to satisfy.  This, at any rate, strikes me as being the dan-
ger at the heart of Brock’s Responsive Democracy.  At the theoretical level, 
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too, it is difficult to square the individualism of Brock’s cosmopolitanism (with 
all its agency and autonomy implications) with what looks surprisingly like an 
explicitly paternalistic theory of global governance (pp. 2-3). 
 
Langlois wonders as well whether my account of Responsive Democracy is ade-
quately democratic.  He thinks the ideal of Responsive Democracy I present is quite a long 
way from some other core ideas central to democracy such as self-determination, where 
the terms of self rule are set by citizens.  The flaw, as Langlois sees it, is that when it 
comes to global governance, there might be great dispute about how to approximate the 
meeting of needs and interests.  And here Langlois believes it is crucial for people to be 
participatorially engaged in the determination of their own political destiny. 
Langlois notes that I am concerned with issues such as abuse of power and notes 
that I discuss ways to guard against this.  But he reckons the real danger lies elsewhere and 
that is «the real abuse that lies at the heart of democracy is when there is a large gap be-
tween people’s perception of their interests, wellbeing and needs, and the account of these 
which is given by the political system» (p. 4).  So the real danger is that people become 
«disenfranchised from a politics and a governance which responds to them but with which 
they have no meaningful connection –rather than being a politics and a governance in 
which they can participate» (p. 4).   
Langlois also draws attention to the fact that Elizabeth Anderson (whose views I 
largely support) emphasizes participation in her model of democratic equality, whereas I 
argue that participation has been overemphasized.  Anderson stresses the importance of 
collective self-determination by means of open discussion among equals in actual institu-
tions.  Though these can be argued to exist in certain modern democracies, they do not 
obtain at the global level, and will not in the foreseeable future. My endorsement of An-
dersonian style Democratic Equality is problematic, according to Langlois, and in some 
tension with other core components for my account of Responsive Democracy.  He says: 
«But precisely because, as Brock herself accepts, there is no mechanism for global collec-
tive self determination, it would seem that this Responsive Democracy is not really the 
same thing as the democracy articulated in Anderson’s Democratic Equality Model.  And 
the fundamental reasons why are these: that not everyone has equal political agency, the 
rules are not acceptable to all, not everyone is entitled to participate, and others will not 
listen respectfully and respond accordingly (Anderson’s desiderata)» (p. 6).  Langlois thinks 
the cure for my account’s problems is for «Anderson’s democratic equality to be more 
rigorously worked into the fabric of Brock’s responsive democracy» (p. 7).  Langlois con-
tinues: «The difficulty that I find with Brock’s excellent and engaging book is her case that 
Responsive Democracy can legitimately downplay the role of agency based arguments for 
democratic equality.  I acknowledge the limitations which she sees in the agency account.  
I don’t accept though that the interest account by itself trumps the agency account» (p. 7). 
Like Langlois, Graham Findlay also critiques my account of democracy.  One im-
portant area of weakness Graham Findlay identifies with my account concerns my «strai-
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tened understanding of democratic agency» (p. 3).  Findlay also challenges the apparent 
lack of participation in the kind of democracy for which I advocate.  He wonders whether 
the worries identified with Responsive Democracy can be allayed through the use I make 
of Anderson’s notion of Democratic Equality.  But, on the contrary, he thinks it brings to 
light a deep tension in my understanding of democracy: «responsive democracies –with 
their expert panels, robustly independent judiciaries, auditors, “commissions of enquiry”, 
etc.  –are vulnerable to capture by elites, especially privileged possessors of greater educa-
tion and capital … I think the dismal history of development interventions by experts who 
were hoping to secure people’s interests, but were unaccountable to those people, is a cau-
tionary tale that shows the dangers of a responsive conception of democracy.  After a long 
and hard learning process, development practitioners are increasingly seeing not just con-
sultation of, but participation with beneficiaries in development projects as crucial to their 
sustainability, long term stability and success» (p. 4).  Findlay also interprets my view as 
not entailing much commitment to equality. In sections below (such as sections 3, 4, and 
5) I clarify the important role relational equality plays in my account of global justice, and 
hope to draw attention to the important, though more indirect, way in which standing in 
relations of equality matters greatly to my account of global justice.   
Langlois and Findlay have raised an important set of concerns and I aim to re-
spond more fully to them shortly.  But first, I make a few remarks about some of the pit-
falls that seem to be more easily avoided in Langlois’ list of weaknesses with my view.  
First, it seems to me there is no prohibition against a highly participative process in the 
formation of the set of interests we take as offering guidance to more responsive forms of 
democracy (more about this in due course).  I do not have any problem with incorporating 
inclusive, participatory processes wherever their operation will be consistent with the re-
quirements to respect other core elements of global justice.  Most of my worries about 
participation are that there are certain well-known limit points at which its operation is 
quite unreliable, and it is at such points that there is scope for responsive rather than parti-
cipatory democracy. There are multiple levels at which people can and should participate, 
for instance, in discussion of what our core interests are, and even concerning priorities 
among them. So participation has an important role to play in matters of global justice.  
However, sometimes these interests are promoted more effectively through a process of 
delegation that can complement more participatory processes and this is where there is 
legitimate scope for more Responsive Democracy to play a role as well.  The interest ac-
count does not trump the agency account (contra one of Langlois’ charges).  Rather, the 
interest account complements and supports the agency view at limit points. 
Indeed, participation in governance matters, promoting agency, and self-
determination are legitimate and important aspects of securing global justice.  But we need 
to ensure a supportive environment in which self-determination is possible in a more 
meaningful sense than much of our current realities allow.  Rather than losing sight of the 
importance of self-determination, I aim to ensure its sphere of operation is as wide and 
meaningful as possible.  Participation in democratic self-government as an equal member 
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of society is central to both Anderson’s and my account.   I think both are needed, but see 
myself as emphasizing a more neglected aspect of what makes democracy function well 
even at limiting points and well-known points of failure.  Contra another of Langlois’s 
charges then, I do not believe there is conflict between my endorsement of Anderson’s 
account of Democratic Equality and a commitment to Responsive Democracy.  In section 
4 I indicate why I think the two forms of democracy complement each other.  In the next 
section I step back for a deeper analysis of some key issues, before drawing them together 
in section 5, in offering a more complete response to Langlois and Findlay’s important set 
of challenges. 
 
DESIDERATA OF GLOBAL JUSTICE AND MULTIPLE TENSIONS:  
SECURING RELEVANT FREEDOM AND EQUALITY FOR ALL 
 
When we add multiple desiderata to a comprehensive account of global justice, there are a 
number of points of tension. There is an especially important tension that arises from a 
commitment to secure freedom and some kind of equality for all.  I think this tension is at 
the root of some of the problems Langlois identifies.  We certainly do want people to en-
joy self-determination, but we also want them to stand in relations of equality with one 
another globally.  Balancing such weighty considerations is bound to lead to points of fric-
tion where their spheres of concern and focus collide.  But I believe my account does a 
respectable job of dealing with those difficult issues, giving good consideration to ideas of 
self-determination and equality.  Recall that I advocate for the more responsive forms of 
democracy only where the agency conception notoriously breaks down.  At such points 
we have, by definition, a break down in whether more participatory models do further 
important causes, including democratic objectives.  So at those places we already have a 
well-known failure of participatory models to lead to democratic outcomes and would 
anyhow need to intervene and supplement with some mechanism, or live with undemo-
cratic consequences.  In that context, what I propose to fill the void strikes me as no 
worse than what an agency theorist might recommend and, arguably, somewhat better in 
that at least it takes seriously the promotion of important interests, already endorsed by 
the populus as worthwhile, and also attempts to underwrite key ingredients for our stand-
ing in relations of equality with one another. Let me explain all of this in more detail by 
starting with some relevant background.  
I briefly recap some core features of Anderson’s account. Egalitarian political 
movements, such as those that oppose racism, sexism, and class oppression, have typically 
been about altering unequal social relations, relations in which some are seen as superior 
and others inferior. They aim to instantiate better the equal moral worth of persons which, 
as Anderson elaborates on the ideal, «asserts that all competent adults are equally moral 
agents: everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, to 
cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a conception 
of their good».i Real egalitarians focus on abolishing oppression and trying to bring about 
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the kind of social order that recognizes each person’s equality, namely, a democratic com-
munity.  So, while living in an egalitarian community involves being free to «participate in 
and enjoy the goods of society, and to participate in democratic self-government» it also 
involves being free from oppression.ii  Citizens must have effective access to levels of 
functioning sufficient to stand as an equal in society. Democratic equality guarantees such 
access by underwriting a package of capabilities to which all law-abiding citizens are en-
titled at all times. Everyone is entitled to enough resources to avoid oppression and to 
function as an equal in society. What counts as enough may vary individually, with social 
or cultural norms, and with environments.iii Standing as an equal in society includes not 
only the possession of resources, but «social relations and norms, and the structure of op-
portunities, public goods and public spaces».iv 
 Real egalitarians focus on abolishing oppression and bringing about the kind of 
social order that recognizes person’s equality, namely, a democratic community in which 
(among other things) all are entitled to «collective self-determination by means of open 
discussion among equals».v How should we extend this focus to the global context? It 
would be nice if people of the world could engage in collective self-determination through 
open discussion among equals, and we should promote mechanisms that enable this (for 
instance, through a second chamber of the United Nations, global media, and other fora 
for global discussion).  But at any rate, this agency-based conception of self-determination 
must also be constrained by other mechanisms, where the agency-based view notoriously 
has limitations. In the next section I discuss how Responsive Democracy can usefully 
complement this idea of Democratic Equality. 
  
WHY DO WE NEED RESPONSIVE FORMS OF DEMOCRACY? 
 
We can assess global governance arrangements in terms of two main desirable variables, 
which are sometimes in tension: effectiveness and accountability. A key aim of global go-
vernance should be to secure both. I argue that a system of governance that both effec-
tively attends to people’s interests and is suitably accountable can claim to have adequate 
democratic credentials on the Responsive Democracy account.  I briefly recap the central 
moves in the argument next. 
Leading theorists in accountability, Robert Keohane and Ruth Grant, define the 
term thus: «accountability implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a 
set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of those 
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not 
been met».vi There are two central models of accountability: a “participation” model and a 
‘delegation’ model. The International Criminal Court is an example of an accountability 
mechanism that does not involve participation, but rather the delegation of power to 
judges, lawyers, and other experts on legal matters. An effective accountability system 
should combine elements from both the participation and the delegation models. So far 
much emphasis has been placed on the role of participation in legitimating governance. 
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There are often reasons to prefer the delegation model, for instance where complex issues 
are at stake that require significant expertise and detailed knowledge of relevant factors.  
Another example would be where there are tensions between what is in our collective in-
terest and yet might be so immediately unpopular that those who take bold but necessary 
action will be punished at the next election. A clear instance of this might be a panel 
(comprised of scientific, economic, and other experts) empowered to formulate policy that 
has binding force in addressing the problem of climate change. In all probability, the poli-
cies such a panel needs to recommend would involve significant costs to current genera-
tions, but ones that it may not be unreasonable to expect them to bear. Would the exis-
tence of some panels empowered to make such decisions threaten the democratic 
credentials of our global governance arrangements?  I argue that it would not by discuss-
ing two central models of democracy. 
There are two conceptions of democracy discernible in practice and theory, and 
their differences are prominent when we ask about the point of global democratic reform. 
On the first (and arguably dominant) model, global democracy is desirable because it 
would enhance political agency. Because human beings should ideally be agents of their 
fates, more democracy at the global level should allow more participation in collective 
decision-making at the global level. On the second account, realizing more democracy 
globally would be desirable because it would enhance the realization of people’s interests. 
On the interest account, which I refer to as «Responsive Democracy»vii, if you want to 
improve democracy at the global level you have to make it more responsive to people’s 
interests and make it better at securing people’s interests. There are several reasons to 
think that if this is an important aim of democratic institutions, then it is not enough simp-
ly to give people more opportunities to voice beliefs about their interests. We will need to 
supplement with institutions that correct several shortcomings that the agency view has. 
These include the following three.  First, cases of collective action problems. These can 
occur when we identify situations that, though they are collectively rational for us to pur-
sue, require the necessary assurance that others will be made to play their parts if it is not 
to be more rational to act selfishly.  Second, the agency view does not always take account 
of all the relevant people whose vital interests will be affected, notably, future generations. 
Democratic institutions may enhance the agency of those adults who currently participate 
in the collective decision, while undermining the interests of other agents not party to the 
decision, namely future generations.  Third, we may be able to identify our interests yet be 
unsure about how to design policies that will best realize those interests. Examples include 
how to deal adequately with global warming or an avian flu pandemic. For instance, 
though we all can identify the interest in minimizing the impact of avian flu on humans, 
there are a number of possibilities as to how this might best be achieved and it is not clear 
that without the necessary expertise the average citizen is well placed to make this deci-
sion. Deciding the best course of action would require more understanding of the issues 
than the average citizen is likely to have or be willing to gain. 
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Real-world institutions of democracy incorporate a number of practices and insti-
tutions that aim to better secure people’s interests when more agency-oriented democratic 
institutions fail. These include schemes to ensure forced saving aimed at counteracting 
ignorance of our long-term good, provision of public goods to offset collective action 
problems, child and environmental protection mechanisms, and public insurance schemes. 
Such mechanisms complement democratic institutions’ ability to realize citizens’ interests, 
though they may themselves be paternalistic in their operation. When there is a tendency 
of democratic decision-making procedures to ignore or discount certain kinds of interests, 
we may supplement with mechanisms aimed at protecting these.viii  All mature, modern 
democracies instantiate the interest model, and there is something theorists should learn 
from this real world practice. Ideally, we can realize both the agency and the interest con-
ceptions of democracy at the global level, but there will sometimes be reasons to prefer 
the latter over the former, such as in the three kinds of cases in which the agency concep-
tion has the shortcomings outlined above. 
In mature democracies there are three ways individuals who are entrusted with 
political power are connected to the electoral process. Some are directly elected, others 
who have legislative power are selected by elected officials, for instance, judges on high 
courts and cabinet ministers. Yet others are selected by elected officials and have no direct 
legislative power. In some countries these would include auditors general, ombudsmen, 
public health officials, ethics commissioners, and commissions of  inquiry. So, several 
central tasks are performed in modern democracies by appointed officials whose role is to 
protect citizens’ fundamental interests against the sometimes more perverse consequences 
that can result from democratic institutions.ix  Though it may be important that some 
connection with elections be maintained, albeit an indirect one, it may be good that such 
officials are not directly elected because it is important that some officials have partial 
independence from popular opinion to allow the integration into policy-making of  a more 
dispassionate and temporally extended view of  the public interest. But the link to 
authorization and constraint is important if  our basic interest in avoiding domination is 
not to be threatened. 
A reasonable concern with such delegation of  responsibility for decision-making 
to expert panels is the potential abuse of  power. However, the idea of  placing trust in 
experts to act responsibly arises frequently in our complex societies and good mechanisms 
to ensure that trust is well placed have been developed.  It is reasonable to trust persons 
empowered to act in my best interests when there are adequate mechanisms in place to 
make such trust reasonable, such as rules governing an appropriate process of  skills’ 
acquisition and accreditation, bodies that regulate professions, peer scrutiny, appropriate 
reporting requirements, adequate opportunities to impose sanctions for inappropriate 
conduct, legal protections, and so forth.  In general it is reasonable to place trust in certain 
others to act as good judges of  our interests when they have been adequately «selected, 
empowered, and constrained».x Furthermore, ensuring the separation of  powers and clear 
demarcation of  the domain of  authority dramatically reduce the scope for abuse of  
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power.  Detailed attention to institutional design is also helpful, as are professional codes 
of  ethics, independent commissions of  appointment and review.xi  It is crucial, then to 
design adequate mechanisms of  institutional and role accountability. It is pleasing to note 
that there is already a rich literature developing in this area.xii The key to adopting effective 
policies at the global level that can gain wide support from citizens is ensuring that 
decision-makers are held suitably accountable.  In this way we would truly have realized a 
more responsive and meaningful form of  democracy. 
Having argued for the importance of  responsive democracy, I now need to show 
how the Responsive Democracy discussed in this section and Democratic Equality 
discussed in section 3 are compatible and fill distinct roles, especially in my account of  
securing global justice.  This I do in the next section. 
 
WHY RESPONSIVE DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY  
COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER 
 
Responsive Democracy and Democratic Equality complement each other in important 
ways.  I explain this important thesis in more detail next.  A key task for relational egalita-
rians is to eliminate oppression and to create communities in which people stand in rela-
tions of equality to one another. There is a natural affinity between this project of Demo-
cratic Egalitarians and that of the Responsive Democracy advocates. The key idea 
according to Democratic Equality is to promote our standing in relations of equality with 
one another in a democratic community and Responsive Democracy has as its goal to 
secure interests that promote relations of equality when an agency-based conception of 
democracy is notoriously unreliable in doing this. Responsive Democracy thus nicely 
complements the idea of Democratic Equality and together these accounts deliver a com-
prehensive view of how to foster standing in relations of equality with one another. I draw 
attention to some of these complementarities next. 
 Relational egalitarians focus on abolishing oppression in trying to bring about the 
kind of social order that recognizes each person’s equality; namely, a democratic commu-
nity. Responsive Democracy complements this notion of Democratic Equality because it 
underwrites the conditions that make such standing meaningful. Responsive Democracy 
also allows us a wider view about all those to whom we should stand in relations of equali-
ty, such as both current and future generations. As well, the theory notes the limits of 
agency-promoting views of democracy and recognizes the need to underwrite the condi-
tions for achieving Democratic Equality when these would not be secure. 
I argue for several mechanisms in Global Justice that are good illustrations of this 
complementarity. I show how supporting press freedom has a vital role to play in promot-
ing channels for presenting and understanding different viewpoints. In many countries, 
special attention needs to be paid to supporting press freedom that might not be respected 
in the course of ordinary market, civil, and political interactions. Freedom of the press 
plays a key role in keeping people accountable and thereby can promote Responsive De-
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mocracy, transparency, the rule of law, development, and security. Responsive forms of 
democracy would ensure mechanisms are in place to protect press freedom, at both the 
domestic and global levels. In addition, the important work the International Criminal 
Court does creates an environment conducive to accountability and securing domestic 
justice. The ICC can act as a back-up guarantor of accountability, when this is not effec-
tively secured within states.  A body that oversees the recruitment of health care workers is 
another good example of Responsive Democracy in action, because it protects the interest 
in health that we all have but which can come under threat in developing countries when 
health care workers are recruited to work in developed countries. An International Tax 
Organization could network the activities of tax authorities that currently exist within 
states and could better secure our interest in ensuring that adequate revenue is available 
for states to function well. The mandate of this organization would be to promote the fair 
collection of tax revenues, such as through assisting in the elimination of tax evasion and 
facilitating transparent reporting of resource sales and purchases.xiii  
For Anderson, standing as an equal in society includes not just having resources, 
but «social relations and norms, and the structure of opportunities, public goods and pub-
lic spaces».xiv As Anderson rightly notes, standing as an equal presupposes all these addi-
tional components, notably public goods and an appropriate structure of opportunities. 
One of the aims of Responsive Democracy is to secure such public goods and opportunity 
structures, especially when these would otherwise be under threat when the agency-based 
conception notoriously breaks down, such as in dealing with climate change or public 
health issues. We need bodies that have global authority if we are to tackle such issues 
effectively.  Many of the international bodies for which I argue, such as the International 
Tax Organization, The Organization to Monitor Recruitment of Health Care Workers, 
The Organization to Promote Responsible Press Freedom, or the International Criminal 
Court, have as their target being responsive to important interests that can be threatened if 
not given special protection. These interests include interests in everyone’s paying their 
fair share of taxes, in promoting a transparent and non-corrupt environment in which a 
culture of accountability is made possible, in non-domination, in securing public goods 
necessary to sustain decent lives, in health, in protection for basic liberties, in being 
enabled to meet our needs, and so on.  Protecting such interests is also important to pre-
serve equality in structures and opportunities.  One of the tasks of Responsive Democracy 
is to block opportunities for inequalities in our social and political arrangements from 
translating into relevant injustices in our relations, especially where they are likely to thwart 
our interest in avoiding domination, such as where it affects ownership of the media, dis-
proportionate influence over elections, and the like.  Responsive Democracy must regulate 
affairs where such injustice is possible. 
We are now in a position to draw several threads together that have been devel-
oped and clarified over the last few sections, to ensure a powerful response to Langlois 
and Findlay is available.  In a comprehensive account of global justice we need to ensure 
we resolve tensions between promoting freedom and equality, and ensure maximum scope 
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for participatory democracy while recognizing an important role for more Responsive 
Democracy where agency-based notions are notoriously unreliable at securing interests.  
My solution to some of these important desiderata is to endorse Democratic Equality and 
Responsive Democracy where necessary to complement and assist Democratic Equality.  
Furthermore, I aim to secure a robust space for self-determination is available through 
protection of the background conditions that enable this meaningful self-determination by 
endorsing mechanisms that come into play through Responsive Democracy and what is 
needed to secure Democratic Equality.  My challenge to Langlois and Findlay would be 
that it would be interesting to hear from them how they would navigate these multiple 
desiderata and tensions and arrive at a position that secures for individuals more space for 
participation than I have been able to allow, while not at the same time being vulnerable to 
some important threats to our freedom, equality, and other desiderata of global justice.   
 
THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF LIBERTY AND IMMIGRATION IN  
AN ACCOUNT OF GLOBAL JUSTICE  
 
Graham Findlay argues that despite the many merits of my account, I present an overly 
minimalist conception of equality and democracy and he explores some ways in which this 
minimalism affects my practical recommendations.  He also criticizes the fact that I do not 
endorse a priority rule that favors liberty over other elements of a decent life.  So, he ar-
gues, «there is no fundamental obstacle to trading off … liberties against other compo-
nents of the minimally decent life» (p. 2).  He worries in particular about how my account 
might license authoritarian societies trading off liberty in the name of preventing potential 
harms.  He argues that a strict priority principle would block such possibilities.  He is also 
troubled by my position on immigration on several counts discussed in detail below.  Let 
me start with responding to the concern about my alleged lack of priority for liberty. 
First, there are a few fundamental obstacles that would be encountered should au-
thoritarian regimes plan to override important basic liberties.  Indeed they would meet 
resistance to such a strategy from each of the four central components that define core 
ingredients of a decent life on my view, namely ensuring due attention is paid to (1) enabl-
ing all to meet basic needs, (2) securing basic liberties, (3) fair terms of co-operation in 
social endeavours and (4) that social and political arrangements are in place that support 
(1)-(3). So to take each element in turn, we have basic needs, such as for autonomy, which 
would provide important constraints on trade-offs aimed at securing other objectives. Fur-
thermore, enjoying liberties is a central component of a decent life, so the second core 
feature of a decent life provides resistance.  Violations of fundamental liberties would also 
almost certainly violate fair terms of social cooperation in social endeavours, and under-
mine social and political arrangements that express and support key elements of a decent 
life.  So it is not clear that authoritarian governments will be able to make many inroads 
trading off important fundamental liberties in the name of alleged harm prevention, as 
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proposed actions are likely to conflict with other core ingredients of what it is to have a 
decent life. 
According to Findlay, my recommendations surrounding immigration policy ap-
parently show some important dangers in failing to give lexical priority to a liberty prin-
ciple.  Furthermore, in contrast with my apparently restrictive view of immigration, Fin-
dlay claims that more migration would lead to more well-being in the world today, since 
many potential migrants lack minimally decent lives and more open migration allows such 
individuals to achieve this.  He suggests that I have, therefore, (inter alia) not taken agency, 
especially migrants’ agency, sufficiently seriously.  But this charge of failing to take mi-
grants’ agency seriously seems too quick for several reasons.  Here are two. It is not clear 
that allowing more migration does improve the prospects for decent lives for those left 
behind or indeed is the best option to pursue for the migrants themselves, especially in 
advancing their own agency.  Many migrants would prefer to have a real choice to stay in 
their countries of origin, if only conditions were improved.  I take this seriously by trying 
to focus rather on policies that would improve situations in home countries that give po-
tential migrants the real choice to stay.  Furthermore, because of the significant losses that 
must be born by those who remain when more skilled migrants leave, their situation is 
badly undermined and so this significantly affects their agency.  I say more about these 
views shortly but continue for now with brief responses to other concerns Findlay 
presents concerning a further catalogue of additional complaints about my account of 
immigration.   
Findlay also criticizes my account of global justice on three further grounds: (i) the 
skilled health care worker case I discuss is not «emblematic of international migration», (ii) 
the migration of individuals from poor countries to wealthy ones is an inappropriate «en-
gine of global justice», and (iii) my alleged «suggestion that immigrants from overpopulated 
countries be required to live in underdeveloped parts of wealthy countries subjects immi-
grants to unfair coercion, restricts their freedom of movement compared to citizens in a 
discriminatory way and makes them a tool of the wealthy country’s economic policy» (p. 5). 
I address some of these complaints next. My discussion of the case study of health 
care worker migration is meant to be representative of one dominant kind of migration 
flow: that of skilled migrants from developing countries to the developed world.  Not all 
migration follows this pattern, but it is a useful case study to show some important losses 
that must be acknowledged and that also mean that the policy which we support should 
attempt to address important setbacks to people’s core interests, the minimal satisfaction 
of which are necessary for a decent life.  To address the second issue, I do not think that 
migration of individuals from poor countries to wealthy ones is an inappropriate “engine 
of global justice”.  Rather, the position is more nuanced: certain kinds of migration pro-
grams are to be denounced as good ways to realize global justice, but others can be per-
fectly permissible, namely those that instantiate what I call “win-win” situations (to be 
discussed below).  And other policy changes may yield further gains in progressing to-
wards global justice still (about which more below as well).  To address the third issue, I 
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do not believe that anyone should be required to live in a particular place as Findlay sug-
gests in the claim cited in (iii) above.  Rather, I describe a particular program in which var-
ious conditions are set on movement that are agreeable to all parties and work in every-
one’s favour and one important condition of this movement is that migrants must move 
to a particular location within a country.  Furthermore, the particular kinds of migrant 
worker programs that do result in win-win situations, would by definition exclude those 
programs that involve the ills to which he refers in many actual real world migrant worker 
programs –high levels of coercion or surveillance– as it is hard to see how they meet the 
“win” criterion for the migrants themselves.   
But first, some background will assist, especially understanding my motivation for 
writing the chapter on immigration in the way I did.  Since much had been written (by 
cosmopolitans, in particular) about the ways in which increasing immigration to developed 
countries can be such an enormously progressive step, part of my aim in drawing attention 
to some detrimental effects was to make more visible some of the undesirable features of 
such movement that should give us pause, especially as cosmopolitans, in wholeheartedly 
supporting increased immigration, without considering the rich possibilities for more nuanced options.  
My ultimate aim is to stimulate thinking about what I unimaginatively call “win-win” situa-
tions, namely better policy proposals that work for all key stakeholder sets: source and 
home countries along with migrants (and these sets can be more finely dissected as well, 
since there are multiple stakeholders in each of the three main groups as well).  I try to 
give some examples of what might count as such policies in Global Justice, section 8.2.4. 
where important losses are addressed in the details of the policies that are endorsed.  
Many of the important reforms that are needed to address poverty are of an institu-
tional nature.  According to the institutional view, a key factor in addressing poverty is 
improving the quality of local institutions, for instance the rule of law that operates in the 
country, which includes institutions that provide dependable property rights, can manage 
conflict, maintain law and order, enable social and political stability, and sustain its regula-
tory capacity.  Institutions that promote the rule of law make for an environment condu-
cive to growth, innovation, investment in education, health, and infrastructure, all impor-
tant in addressing poverty.  So if creating better institutions is a significant component in 
helping people out of poverty, it may be that what helps particular groups of migrants 
meet their basic needs in the short term actually undermines the meeting of more pro-
found needs, or more fundamental ways to meet needs, for those left behind in the longer 
run.  These are the sorts of trade-offs we must squarely face if there is compelling evi-
dence concerning such tensions. 
High rates of migration can undermine the ability of those in source countries to 
meet their needs and promote other essentials of global justice, in securing basic liberties, 
fair terms of co-operation and social and political arrangements that support core ingre-
dients for justice.  Some of this failure happens through institutional damage but other 
damage occurs more directly, for instance, when fewer nurses are left in a country who are 
then able to attend to the health needs of developing country citizens.  Another central 
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complaint is about the unreliability of remittances in securing core ingredients for global 
justice.  I note the following negative effects which are observed for home countries: (1) 
the inflow of funds can create dependence for recipients; (2) dependence can encourage 
further migration, especially among the working age, productive adults; (3) both home and 
host countries can become dependent on continuing the arrangements; (4) economic ac-
tivity can become depressed in countries of origin, which encourages more immigration; 
(5) needed economic reforms can be neglected, as are the creation of rewarding opportun-
ities in the home country; (6) remittances decline over time –remittance flows are at their 
strongest between three and five years after departure; and (7) remittances may have a 
positive effect on transient poverty, but do not by themselves reduce structural poverty.  
While drawing attention to some negative effects, I also note a number of the positive 
effects of remittances as well: remittances put money directly in the hands of those who 
need assistance, consumption choices can have multiplier effects that spillover to others, 
the sheer magnitude of remittances (in many cases greater than the total for Foreign Di-
rect Investment and other major exports) suggests that they are a considerable force, and 
so on.xv  While one might concede the value of remittances, one can also, quite consistently, 
express concerns about observed negative effects.  I then suggest ways in which some of 
the negative effects can be addressed through skillful policy design. 
Overall, my aim is to stimulate better policy design which takes account of positive 
and negative effects.  The appropriate response to detrimental effects of brain drain is not 
to limit migration generally, rather it is to endorse policies that are “win-win” for all rele-
vant stakeholders.  Nuanced policy analysis needs to ensure everyone does gain adequately 
from migration policy and frequently this means more attention needs to be paid to the 
losses developing countries will sustain, losses which in many cases can be addressed 
through compensation though, interestingly, not always.  (Though loss of service and 
funds are easier to compensate for, it is not always easy to see how to remedy institutional 
damage.) 
While freedom, especially freedom of movement is important, just how it must be 
weighed against a variety of other equally important goals requires significant discussion.  
So, does specifying terms of exit undermine our legitimate freedom of movement?  My 
overall position is that while everyone should share the costs associated with remedying 
global injustice, skilled professionals from developing countries can also be called upon to 
play their parts.  Giving back a year of service, paying back funding received for tertiary 
education and the like, can be viewed as fair policies and, moreover, ones that do not im-
portantly undermine freedom. As already noted, there is compelling evidence to suggest 
that institutions matter greatly in improving prosperity, whatever other factors are also 
significant.xvi  One of the most worrisome setbacks developing countries suffer from emi-
gration is damage to institutions, institution-building, and therefore the loss that is sus-
tained in opportunities for development and escape from poverty.  When a highly skilled 
citizen of such a community leaves to take up employment elsewhere, there are a number 
of costs she now imposes on the community she leaves.  Notably, there are the training 
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costs which are frequently heavily subsidized by the community, but there are others that 
are likely to have just as important an effect on development, such as the stream of servic-
es she would have provided, the loss of income from taxed wages, the loss of progressivity 
in fiscal arrangements, the fact that worse off citizens must now bear more of the cost of 
public goods, the contribution that person would have made to a well-governed communi-
ty including participating in civic and political affairs, and, in general, the loss of people 
likely to be both important sources of demand and supply for better institutions.  The 
departing individual therefore imposes burdens and as a beneficiary of the community’s 
hospitality, nurturance, and protection, she has a duty to address the loss she has created 
for the community that helped her become the person she now is, notably, one who has 
been educated to a sufficiently high level that she is able to take up well-paying opportuni-
ties in a global employment market.  She has clearly derived benefits here and therefore 
has incurred some relevant duties.  
By leaving without compensation, emigrants create disadvantages for others. Those left 
behind are made more vulnerable by the emigrants’ decisions, as the viability of  their 
enjoying a decent society could be under threat, so they deserve protection from the 
disadvantages the emigrants have now created for them.  Furthermore, when governments 
invest scarce resources in creating human capital to provide for the needs of  their citizens, 
they are entitled to fair returns on their investment and so they are entitled to claim 
compensation from those who will benefit from their investment; indeed, not to do so 
would be to squander public resources.  
By specifying terms of departure –such as the permissibility of developing coun-
tries implementing compulsory service programs or that developed countries may be re-
quired to pay compensation– are we are undermining the freedom of emigrants unfairly, 
or unfairly limiting their opportunities?  In response, I note that this kind of objection 
focuses on the freedom of those who choose to leave, rather than the freedom of those 
left behind: Should they not also be able to enjoy the freedom to live and work in their 
home country?  Without compensatory or interventive measures, members of the devel-
oping country face important losses which we should not reasonably ask people to accept. 
We should try to secure for all a genuine opportunity to live and work in their home coun-
try.  Failing to take action or “doing nothing” is not in fact “doing nothing” but rather 
ignoring the disadvantages the most vulnerable must face, and favoring the interests of the 
better off over the less well-off.  Equal consideration of the interests of the less well-off, 
requires that their needs and interests be given at least equal weight to the interests of the 
emigrants. 
Would imposing costs (such as one year of compulsory service) on those who wish 
to leave not be a way of unjustly limiting the freedom of movement of these people?  
Though freedom of movement is an important liberty that we should be allowed to enjoy, 
even within the most well-functioning communities this liberty always has various limits 
attached to it.  I may not freely move about in ways that conflict with people’s property 
rights, for instance, I may not freely move into your house without your permission. Other 
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cases where limiting freedom of movement can be justified include: quarantining people 
for public health reasons or limiting people’s abilities to use particular threatened habitats 
in efforts to protect them. The limits of my freedom of movement often coincide with 
harms or setbacks to others’ important interests, and so it is precisely an open question if 
we have identified setbacks to others’ important interests that should have some appropri-
ate weight.  While we do generally think freedom to dissociate should have some consider-
able force, notice that we do sometimes think exit costs are appropriate.  Our practices 
around fair dissolution of marriages recognize the permissibility of specifying terms under 
which dissolution may proceed, especially the permissibility of requiring financial transfers 
to be made to parties whose important interests would otherwise be compromised and 
requirements concerning ongoing care for vulnerable parties, notably children.  So we al-
ready have quite established practices of how to recognize and acknowledge the impor-
tance of freedom while balancing this freedom in sophisticated ways with addressing 
losses.  There is no reason why similar arrangements concerning migration would show 
any less respect for our freedom when they also set appropriate conditions on the exercise 
of that freedom. 
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